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The siting of facilities for large-scale, novel technologies presents a 
formidable challenge to political risk management. This paper develops a 
model for describing the decision process for this type of societal prob- 
lem. It explicitly considers the role of the relevant interested parties, 
each of whom brings to the siting debate its own set of objectives and 
attributes. We have labeled the approach a multi-attribute multi-party 
model (MAMP) to distinguish it from prescriptive techniques such as 
multi-attribute utility analysis or decision analysis. 
The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature 
on the key role that limited time, attention and information processing 
capabilities play in political decision making when there are uncertain 
outcomes and likely conflicts among interested parties. The model also 
highlights the importance of decentralized and sequential decision mak- 
ing and indicates the role that formal risk assessments have played at 
each stage of the process. We illustrate its application in the context of 
the decision process associated with a proposed liquefied natural gas ter- 
minal in California. The concluding portion of the paper suggests future 
research needs for improving the credibility of analysis and facilitating 
collective action with respect to facility siting problems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale, novel technologies such as nuclear power or liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) promise to yield benefits to society, but only at the cost 
of potential catastrophic losses. Thus the siting of the facilities tor these 
technologies presents a formidable challenge to political risk manage- 
ment processes. There are two features of these problems which make 
them particularly difficult to structure analytically. First, unlike most 
private market transactions, the selection of a site for these facilities 
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affects many different individuals and groups. People, regardless of per- 
sonal preference, are exposed to the s a n e  rislrs which may produce con- 
flicting views as to what alternatives are acceptable. Proposed LNG pro- 
jects are thus examples of public goods.' 
A second feature of the siting problem is the absence of a data base 
which provides conclusive statistical evidence on the likely performance 
of the new technology and the probability distribution associated with 
potential accidents. Each of the interested parties may thus provide dif- 
ferent estimates of the chances and consequences of certain events. 
There are n o  objective measures to settle these differences. 
This paper describes a model of the decision making process for 
problems such as the siting of facilities based on new technologies. Dif- 
ferent elements of society are affected by these projects and there are 
limited statistical data bases on the associated risks. The model consid- 
ers the role of the many interested parties and their specific concerns. It 
emphasizes the potential for conflict emerging among the interested par- 
ties as a result of their differing objectives, mandates and information 
sources. We have labeled it a multi-attribute multi-party (MAMP) 
approach to distinguish it from the prescriptive techniques developed in 
the literature such as multi-attribute utility models or decision analysis. 
The MAMP model serves two principal purposes. A central focus of a 
IIASA research project- is an analysis of the siting decision concerning 
liquefied natural gas terminals in four countries (the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States). 
3 ~ o r  a more detailed description of the characteristics of public goods see Stokey and Zeck- 
hauser (19'78, pp.305-308). 
A discussion of the factors influencing the siting process in different 
countries appears in Kunreuther, Linnerooth, and Starnes (in press). The 
MAMP model has enabled us to standardize our presentation. In a more 
general sense, it may be a useful tool for undertaking comparative ana- 
lyses across cultures and across problems. 
Secondly, the MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning 
literature in the social sciences on the key role that limited time, atten- 
tion and informa tion processing capabilities play in political decision 
making where there are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among 
interested parties. It, thus, reflects the importance of understanding 
decision processes as a first step in trying to improve the way society 
copes with these types of public goods. 
We illustrate the application of MAMP in the context of one of our 
four case studies--the siting of an LNG terminal in California. A brief 
description of the nature of the problem provides a perspective on this 
case. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy which 
requires a fairly complicated technological process that  has the potential, 
albeit with very low probability, of creating severe losses. For purposes of 
transporting, natural gas can be converted to  liquid form a t  about 1/600 
its gaseous volume. It is shipped in specially constructed tankers and 
received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification and is then dis- 
tributed. The entire system (i.e., the liquefaction facility, the LNG tank- 
ers, the receiving terminal and regasification facility) can cost more than 
81 billion to construct (Office of Technology Assessment 1977). In 1974, 
three LNG terminals were proposed for California. After seven years of 
negotiations, hearings and studies, on three levels of government, there is 
still no approved site for any of the proposed terminals in California. 4 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly specify the 
conceptual foundations of the MAMP model. Section Ill provides a more 
formal structure building on concepts first proposed by Braybrooke 
(1974). In Section IV we show how the decision process for LNG siting in 
California can be examined through the use of the model. Section V sug- 
gests ways that the MAMP model can help to better understand the socie- 
tal decision-making process. The concluding section suggests future 
research needs for improving the process. 
n. RELJWANT C O N ~ P T S  
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
The theoretical and empirical literature on decision processes in 
organization theory and political science form the basis for the develop- 
ment of the MAMP model. We review some of the important concepts 
below. There is a growing recognition in the political science literature 
that decision makers are limited in their ability and desire to collect 
information on which to base their actions. They thus attempt to  satisfice 
rather than optimize. One of the earliest descriptions of t h s  bounded 
rational behavior in the context of societal decision making is by Lind- 
blom (1959) where he contends that the political process is one of incre- 
mental muddling rather than comprehensive choice. Instead of examin- 
'A more detailed discussion of the California siting process appears in Kunreuther and 
Lathrop (in press), Lathrop (1981), Linnerooth (1980). 
ing the full range of alternatives available, government agencies or politi- 
cians focus only on a limited set of options. They proceed incrementally 
by comparing the results of each new policy with old ones, thus drasti- 
cally simplifying the decision making process from the one implied by the 
classical rational model of choice (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963). 
Implicit in the concept of incremental decision making is the 
assumption that  individuals and interested parties have a very limited 
amount of time available to deal with any particular problem. An excel- 
lent illustration of this feature of political decision making is Wildavsky's 
(1964) analysis of the US budgetary process. Due to  the complex struc- 
ture and myriad sets of figures in the budget it is necessary for officials 
to  employ simplified tools in making their choices. One of the principal 
ways budget officials justify their actions is to use last year's budget as a 
guide. In fact, Wildavsky points out tha t  
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive .... Thus the men 
who make the budget are  concerned with relatively small incre- 
ments to a n  existing base. Their attention is focused on a small 
number of items over which the budgetary battle is fought 
(p.15). 
MULTIPLE PARTIES AND MULTIPLE ISSUES 
The literature in both organization theory and political science pro- 
vides a n  important perspective on the  societal decision making process 
by stressing the role of multiple parties, each of whom have their own 
goals and objectives. For example, March and Simon (1958) and Cyert 
and March (1963) view the organization as a coalition of parties each of 
whom imposes different demands on the system. The goals of the firm 
arise through a process of bargaining among potential coalition members. 
In a similar vein, Neustadt (1970), in his later reflections on presidential 
power, points out that each of the interested parties in the government 
has its own interests and separate responsibilities. Policy emerges as a 
result of political bargaining among the actors. 
One of the finest studies illustrating the importance of multiple par- 
ties in the decision making process is Allison's (1971) analysis of the 
Cuban missile crisis. Of the three models he develops to explain the way 
policy is made, his Government Politics Model (Model 111) comes closest to 
our view of the societal decision making process. Allison points out that 
in decision making situations there are many actors who are in the game 
as players. Each of them focuses on multiple problems rather than a sin- 
gle issue and have a set of national, organizational, and personal goals. 
The parties share power and have conflicting preferences. In order to 
determine how a particular decision emerges it is necessary to identify 
the various issues which are deemed important, to indicate what bargains 
and compromises emerged and "to convey some feel for the confusion" 
(p.146). 
CONFLICTS AND AGENDAS 
If there are competing parties in the societal decision making game, 
then there are likely to be emerging conflicts. One of the important ques- 
tions whch  has been studied in recent years is how these potential con- 
flicts are handled. Cyert and March (1963) hypothesize that conflict is 
rarely resolved in an organization but that sequential and decentralized 
decision making enable actions to be taken in many situations even if 
there are inconsistent goals between the parties. The importance of 
these features of the organizational decision making process in the con- 
text of political decision making is hghlighted by the following quote from 
Simon ( 1967): 
Influence over the direction of attention of the political organs 
is a principal means for affecting action. The notion of power as 
a tug-of-war between alternatives yields to a notion of power as 
influence on a sequential process in which actions must be gen- 
erated as well as chosen and in which attention is a scarce 
resource (p. 108). 
This characterization of the decision process is similar to the one 
formulated by Allison who suggests that each one of the parties in the 
game faces an agenda with hundreds of deadlines, not all of which are 
being met. There is thus a need for some type of priorization among 
items. In other words one needs to consider the nature of the agenda set- 
ting process. As one would expect, those items which are placed on the 
legislative agenda become an important determinant of the final deci- 
sions which will be taken by society. 
Cobb and Elder (1972) indicate that an important way that an issue 
gets placed on the agenda is through some type of exogenous event which 
creates conflict. They illustrate this phenomenon using the example of 
the passage of the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, designed to 
reduce deaths from mine accidents and protect miners from blacklung 
disease. The legislation was triggered initially by a cave-in of a West Vir- 
ginia coal mine which trapped and eventually killed seventy-eight miners. 
This disaster caused the miners to strike, which brought pressure on the 
state and federal government to react to the miners' concerns. 
In another context, Holling (1981) has pointed out how specific crises 
in the short-run can lead to changes in policies with respect to environ- 
mental and ecological problems (e.g.,  the suppression of the spruce 
budworm after it had destroyed forests in Canada). Kunreuther and 
Lathrop (in press) describe with specific examples how exogenous events 
triggered new coalitions and new legislation regarding LNG siting decision 
in the United States. 
One reason for the  importance of exogenous events, such as crises 
and disasters, in triggering societal interest in a specific problem is that  
it is easily understood evidence of trouble. Walker (1977) stresses the  
importance of this factor in setting the discretionary agenda of the US 
Congress or a government agency. To support this point, Walker presents 
empirical evidence on the passage of safety legislation in the United 
States. 
SEQUENTIAL PROCESSING OF ISSUES 
Braybrooke (1974, 1978) has developed an  interesting concept of the 
political system which he views "as a machine or colIection of machines 
for processing issues." In contrast to the static theory of collective 
choice based on the pioneering work of Arrow (1963), Braybrooke views 
the decision making process as sequential and constantly changing. At  
any point in time there is an  issue or set of issues which invoIve a set of 
interested parties. Over time particular issues may be resolved, disap- 
pear, or  be transformed as new information or new alternatives emerge. 
In particular, new proposals may be constructed to reflect either the 
changes in preferences of the interested parties and/or a revised set of 
societal values. 
The importance of Braybrooke's work is that it enables one to 
decompose a problem into smaller subproblems by focusing on relevant 
issues. It thus captures the sequential decision making process whlch 
characterizes individual and organizational problem solving (March 1978) 
as well as the public policy making process (Gershuny 1981). 
The setting of an agenda is likely to play a role in determining the 
final outcome emerging from this sequential decision process. Empirical 
evidence from the field as well as from laboratory experiments (Levine 
and Plott 1977) indicates that the order in which specific subproblems 
are considered frequently leads to different outcomes for the same 
broader question. 
We expect the same order effect for societal decision making prob- 
lems for two principal reasons. Once a particular decision has been made 
on a particular issue this serves as a constraint for the next set of issues. 
If the order of the issues is reversed then there is likely to be a different 
set of choices to consider. Secondly, each issue involves a different set of 
interested parties who bring with them their own set of data to bolster 
their cause. The timing of the release of this information may have an 
effect on later actions. For example, citizens groups normally enter the 
scene with respect to siting problems only when their own community is 
being considered as a possible candidate. The order in which different 
locations are considered is thus likely to influence the final outcome of 
the siting debate. 
SUMMARY 
In summary there is a large body of literature which has emerged in 
recent years suggesting that the societal decision making process is one 
where there are a number of interested parties who have their own goals 
and objectives. Each actor has his own set of information which he uses 
to defend specific recommendations. As a way of reducing potential con- 
flicts, the decision making process is frequently sequential and decentral- 
ized, since many items are competing for limited time and attention. The 
process of agenda building is an important element in understanding why 
certain problems are considered important and others are ignored. 
Recent empirical studies have stressed the importance of exogenous 
events as an important variable in explaining this process. Political deci- 
sion making is likely to follow a sequential process whereby new issues 
emerge through the resolution of previous issues, changes in party 
preferences and/or social norms. 
111. SI'RUCTURE OF THE MAMP MODEL 
The above concepts are now incorporated into a model of a sequen- 
tial decision process which involves different interested parties at  each 
stage. The model views political decision making in terms of the concepts 
discussed in the previous section. It should be viewed as a first step in 
characterizing societal decision making with limited information. 
ROUNDS 
The decision process can be separated into different rounds which we 
label by capital letters, A,B,  . . .  A round is simply a convenient device to 
illustrate a change in the focus of discussions. Ths new focus or direction 
can be triggered by (1) a key decision taken (or a stalemate reached due 
to conflicts among parties), or (2) a change in the context of the discus- 
sions due to an unanticipated event, the entrance of a new party or new 
evidence brought to the debate. Though we will treat rounds as sequen- 
tial in our illustrative case study, they may also be overlapping. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The decision process in each round is characterized by a unique 
problem formulation phase. The alternatives for discussion are bounded 
by specific constraints. These include legislative and legal mandates 
requiring specific parties to be part of the debate, resource constraints 
which have the effect of limiting certain parties from exerting an influ- 
ence because they do not have adequate funds and means; and prespeci- 
fied voting procedures indicating what parties have the power to influence 
the outcome of specific decisions and in what ways. The previous deci- 
sions already taken will also influence the way the problem is formulated. 
In this sense the agenda setting process will have an impact on final out- 
comes. 
A round of discussions is initiated by a formal or informal request. 
Informal discussions may be initiated simply by such actions as a request 
for information on the part of one of the parties or a request for prelim- 
inary discussions. Because the particular form of these initiating 
requests may further define or limit the bounds of the discussion, the 
careful scrutiny of their wording is important. For example, it may make 
a difference in the decision process if the question is framed as "which 
site,if any, is appropriate?", or "whether one of the proposed sites x, y,  
and z is appropriate?" Belnap and Steel (1976) refer to the first question 
as a "which question" and the second as a "whether" question. Whether 
questions demand more complicated considerations and detailed thinking 
while which-questions can be approached with simpler rules of thumb and 
heuristics. 
ALTERNATIVES, ATTRIBUTES, AND DECISIONS 
No matter how a round is initiated it is characterized by a unique 
problem formulation which is presented in the form of a limited set  of 
alternatives due to information processes, limitations and the constraints 
affecting the interested parties. 
We define the alternatives for Round A to be A 1 , A 2 , ~ ' ,  . . . ; Round B 
has alternatives 8' ,B~,B'  . . . . There can be several decisions made in 
any round but by definition they are based on the same set of alterna- 
tives. In other words, if the set of alternatives change we will treat this as 
a new round.5 Each alternative is characterized by a set of attributes 
X I . .  ... X, . The value of any attribute can change from round to round on 
'Two rounds, however, can utilize the same alternatives. The difference between the rounds 
may be due to a revised problem formulation (e.g., new legislation or constraints). 
the basis of new information or perceptual changes. For certain attri- 
butes any party involved may have target or aspiration levels which 
determine whether he considers a particular alternative in Round A to be 
acceptable with respect to attribute Xi.  
Another important feature of the decision process is that the value of 
an attribute to the same interested party can change over time because 
of new information. For example, if a report provides new insight into the 
seismic risk associated with a particular site this may cause a change in 
the perception of this attribute by one or more of the parties involved. 
That change may take the form of a different estimate of the level of the 
attribute for that  site, or perhaps a different weight given to  the relative 
importance for the attribute. 
INTERACTION PHASE 
To understand a particular pattern of institutional choice i t  is neces- 
sary to analyze a se t  of policy actors IP],  their respective power posi- 
tions, their interactions with one another a t  different stages of the pro- 
cess, and the information available to  them. We define Pk to be the k t h  
interested party in the debate. Its evaluation of alternative A' is based 
on its estimation of the levels and values of each attribute resulting from 
that  option, and the relative importance given to each attribute. Another 
party might have different estimates of the effects of a n  option, different 
costs and benefits resulting from those effects, or, assign different rela- 
tive importance to  each of the attributes. Because of any of these differ- 
ences one party may rank alternatives differently than another. As we 
shall see in our analysis of the California case this happened frequently. 
Thus in the case of two interested parties and two alternatives it is possi- 
ble that party 1 prefers A' to A2,  while party 2 has the reverse reaction. 
The interaction among the parties is represented by the main argu- 
ments each brings to the debate in support of or in rejection of each of 
the alternatives at  hand. Those arguments may relate to only one or two 
attributes. It is not suggested here that the arguments presented for or 
against a particular proposal necessarily reflect a concern of the party 
making the argument. For example, a party opposed to  a site because of 
its concern for environmental quality may present an argument using 
seismic risk as the main reason to reject the site. The argument attri- 
bute may be selected to maximize the effectiveness of the argument, not 
to reflect the actual concern of the party. The argument reflects a stra- 
tegy on the part  of the actor in support of or opposition to  the proposal. 
The strategy of the actors can reveal a number of underlying motives and 
desires of those concerned and may be essential in understanding the 
interpretation and use of scientific evidence, including risk analyses. 
The interaction phase provides useful insights into the process. Par- 
ties often come into the debate with firm preferences. The interaction 
phase brings out their arguments, i.e., attributes and perceptions, and 
may change their positions on an issue. The stability of the system can, 
a t  least-partially, be judged by the degree to which the actors--people 
holding certain recognized positions (i. e . ,  officials experts, group leaders) 
or collections of these people, whether formally organized institutions or 
loosely working alliances--remain the same after each successive round. 
The outcome of the political debate results, to a large extent, from 
some combination of the political power on the part of the parties 
involved, the attention they give to the issues in light of their limited 
resources and time, the way in which the problems on the political 
agenda are framed, and the exogenous events that may change the prob- 
lem and/or the parties. The interaction phase can be thought of as the 
formal and informal communication among the parties influencing the 
decision outcome. Wynne (1981) has shown the futility of assuming that 
parties interact as "rational" actors in the sense of actively and openly 
pursuing clearly defined objectives, but that defensive behavior, that  is, 
the avoidance of problems and dangers, may be no less rational than 
goal-directed behavior. 
In addition, Majone (1979) points out that organizational behavior is 
usually not directed at  problem solving in any rational sense, but rather 
at  serving the longer-run interests of the organization or institution. In 
the public domain, as opposed to the market, decisions must be justified 
with seemingly objective arguments, and a consensus within and /or 
beyond an  organization can only be reached with convincing and institu- 
tionally appropriate arguments. Therefore, the arguments made by the 
parties, though they cannot be interpreted as representing clearly 
defined goals, are important insofar as they reveal the complex strategies 
and counter strategies of those in the policy game. 
CONCLUDING A ROUND 
The round is concluded by a decision, a stalemate, a change in infor- 
mation (changing the focus of the debate and hence initiating a new 
round), or an exogenous event (e.g., a disaster) aborting the discussions 
and requiring a new round of inquiry. Each decision can, in turn, be 
described by the tradeoffs implicit in the choice made. These tradeoffs 
may not be explicitly recognized by the decision maker, or not explicitly 
analyzed in the process of making the decision. 
Figure 1  provides a schematic diagram of the MAMP model. In the 
problem formulation phase of each round certain constraints cir- 
cumscribe the issues. An initiating event determines the limited set of 
alternatives J ~ . . . {  which, in turn, induce a set  of interested parties 
{Pk{ to enter the scene. Each of these parties has its own preferences for 
a given set of alternatives, these preferences are defended by a set of 
attributes. The interaction process results either in a clear decision or 
an outcome that does not have the appearance of a decision but that does 
conclude the round. 
The conclusion of round J  can take one of two forms. If there is a 
feasible and agreed-upon solution or if no solution is possible, the process 
ends. However, if one or more parties is unsatisfied with the situation a t  
the end of the round, and has recourse to  other channels, or if the round 
ends in a request for further action, a new problem is formulated for 
Round J + l  and the above sequence is repeated for another set of alterna- 
tives, interested parties (some or all may be the same as in J), etc. 
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Figure 1: Multiattribute Multiparty (MAMP) 
Model of Choice 
IV. APPLYING MAMP: THE SITING OF THE CALIFORNIA LNG TERMINAL 
In this section we will apply the MPlMP framework to the question 
whether California should have an LNG terminal. We will first specify the 
relevant interested parties, and then focus on the actual decision pro- 
cess. 
INTERESTED PARTIES AND RELENANT ATTRIBUTES 
To structure the siting process we need to have a good understand- 
ing of the different concerns of the interested parties. For the LNG prob- 
lem there are three categories of concern which are relevant: risk 
aspects, economic aspects, and environmental aspects. Each of these 
concerns can be described by a set of attributes. Table 1 depicts an 
interested party/attribute matrix showing the main concerns of each of 
the relevant groups over this seven year period. 
The attributes listed have been selected to reflect the nature of 
debates in the process, that is, to reflect the attributes as perceived by 
the parties in the debate, rather than to characterize in some logical 
analytical manner the alternatives. For example, population risk ( x ~ )  
involves the risk to life and limb to neighbors of the LNG terminal due to 
accidents including those induced by earthquakes. Earthquake risk (Xg), 
which involves both population risk and supply interruption risk due to 
earthquakes, is included as a separate attribute since it was handled as 
such in the process. 
T a b l e  1: P r i n c i p a l  P a r t y - b y - A t t r i b u t e  Mat r ix  f o r  LNG S i t i n g  i n  C a l i f o r n i a  
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P~ 
'l(ey t o  P a r t y  Acronyms, A b b r e v i a t i o n s  : 
Local  
- 
Municip. 
'6 
.-- 
S t a t e  
FERC: F e d e r a l  Energy Regu la to ry  Commission, or i n  t h e  f i r s t  t w o  rounds  o f  t h e  process, its p r e c e d i n g  agency,  
t h e  F e d e r a l  Power ~ o m n i s s i o n .  
CCC: C a l i f o r n i a  C o a s t a l  Commission 
CPUC: C a l i f o r n i a  P u b l i c  U t i l i t i e s  Commission 
Leg i s :  C a l i f o r n i a  S t a t e  L e g i s l a t u r e  
Municip: Munic ipal  Government 
CCC 
P3 
CPUC 
P4 
Leg i s .  
P5 
The filled cells in Table 1 indicate which parties pay particular atten- 
tion to which attributes. Naturally, many of the parties care about all the 
attributes listed. However, either because of the incentives directly felt 
by the party or because of the role the party plays in society, each party 
makes its decisions as a function primarily of a particular subset of the 
attributes. 
The applicant, Western LNG Terminal Associates, was a special com- 
pany set up to represent the LNG siting interests of three gas distribution 
utilities: Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric, and 
El Paso Natural Gas Company. As domestic gas supplies seemed to be 
diminishing in the late 1960s, the gas utilities perceived an increased risk 
of supply interruption, which could be mitigated by additional supplies 
such as LNG. Quite naturally, the applicant was primarily concerned with 
profitability (Xs) and secure supplies of gas (XI). 
At the various government levels there are five principal parties. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the Department of 
Energy is the principal body a t  the federal level whch  determines 
whether a proposed LNG project is in the public interest and should be 
allowed. In making its judgment it considers primarily the following attri- 
butes: risk factors ( x ~  ,X2, and X3), environmental guidelines as 
reflected in air quality (x*) and use of land (X5), and the expected LNG 
price (X,). 
Let us turn now to state agencies which play a role. The California 
Coastal Commission (CCC) was created in 1976, and has the responsibility 
for the protection of the California coastline. Its primary concerns with 
respect to LNG siting are with the use of land (X5) and the associated 
risks (X2 and X3)from building a terminal at  a specific site. The California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is the principal state body involved in 
power plant issues and is primarily concerned with the rate-setting pro- 
cess. Hence i t  focused on the provision of energy to California residents 
and need for gas (XI) and the proposed price of the product ( x ~ ) .  In 
addition, it has responsibility for evaluating the impact that a proposed 
facility would have on the environment and safety. The California state 
legislature is ultimately responsible for the outcome of any siting pro- 
cess. It determines which state and local agencies have final authority to  
rule on the feasibility of a proposed site. In addition, it can se t  standards 
to constrain any siting process. Hence the concerns of the legislators 
range over economic, environmental and safety attributes as shown in 
Table 1. 
At  the local level, the city councils evaluate the benefits of a pro- 
posed terminal in their jurisdiction in terms of the tax, business reve- 
nues, and jobs (Xe) it promises to  provide. The Councils t ry to balance 
this positive feature with the impact that the facility would have on land 
use (x5) and risk to the population (X2), Finally, the public interest 
groups, represented by the Sierra Club and local citizens groups, are  pri- 
marily concerned with environmental and safety issues. The important 
message of Table 1 does not lie in the details of exactly which cells are 
filled, but lies in the generally great differences between columns of the 
table. That is, the different parties in the process care about very dif- 
ferent subsets of the attributes. 
THE DECISION PROCESS 
The siting process in California (which is not yet terminated) can be 
characterized by four rounds of discussions as shown in Table 2, which 
provides a summary of the entire process. Each round, in turn, contains a 
summary of how the problem was defined, the initiating event, and how 
the discussions were concluded. The remainder of this subsection 
discusses in more detail the decision process within each of the rounds. 
The main elements of rounds A, B, C, and D are described in Tables 3, 4, 5 
and 6, respectively. 
Round A began in September 1974, when the applicant filed for 
approval of three sites on the California Coast--Point Conception, Oxnard, 
and Los Angeles--to receive gas from Indonesia. The application raised 
two central questions which defined the problem addressed in Round A: 
Does California need LNG, and if so, which, if any, of the proposed sites is 
appropriate? 
The agenda for discussion was more narrowly defined a t  this stage. 
The wheels of the process were set into motion, not by a broadbased 
energy-policy question initiated in Washington, but by a proposal from 
industry for three pre-selected sites. The importance of this process- 
where the initiative is taken first by industry--in preselecting the agenda 
for debate cannot be overemphasized. The initiating proposal framed the 
problem as "Should the proposed LNG sites be approved?", and n o t  
"Should California have an LNG terminal in view of the alternatives, costs, 
risks, etc.?" Setting the agenda in this manner did not preclude the 
"need" question from entering the debate, but it did ensure that the 
Table 2: Summary of Rounds i n  Cal i fornia  LNG S i t i n g  Case 
ROUND A DATE 
-
Problem Formulation: Should the  proposed s i t e s  be approved? 
That is: Does Ca l i fo rn ia  need LNG, 
and i f  so ,  which, i f  any, of the  
proposed s i t e s  is appropriate? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant f i l e s  f o r  approval of  t h r e e  September 1974 
s i t e s .  (34 months) 
Conclusion : 
ROUND B 
Applicant perceives t h a t  no s i t e  is  July  1977 
approvable without long delay 
Problem Formulation: How should need f o r  LNG be determined? 
I f  need is es tabl ished,  how should an 
LNG f a c i l i t y  be s i t e d ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant and o the rs  p u t  pressure  on J u l y  1977 
s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  LNG 
s i t i n g .  ( 2  months ) 
Conclusion: 
ROUND C 
N e w  s i t i n g  process s e t  up t h a t  essen- September 19 77 
t i a l l y  assumes a need f o r  LNG, and is 
designed t o  acce le ra te  LNG terminal  
s i t i n g  
Problem Formulation: Which s i t e  should be approved? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant f i l e s  f o r  approval of October 1977 
Po in t  Conception s i t e  (10 months) 
Conclusion : 
ROUND D 
S i t e  approved condit ional  on J u l y  1978 
considerat ion of  addi t ional  seismic 
r i s k  d a t a  
Prcblem Formulation: Is Poin t  Conception se ismical ly  s a f e ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Regulatory agencies s e t  up procedures 
t o  consider add i t iona l  seismic r i s k  d a t a  
Conclusion: (Round s t i l l  i n  progress)  
question was only considered in the context of a siting application. 
Table 3 also specifies the relevant interested parties who were 
involved in the interaction phase of Round A. Those parties which had 
formal decision power are marked with an asterisk. There were four pri- 
mary attributes which were utilized in the ensuing debate among the par- 
ties. The need for LNG or the risk of an interruption in the supply of 
natural gas (XI) supported the locating of a terminal in at least one of the 
three proposed sites. While environmental, land-use considerations (X5) 
suggested a non-remote site (Los Angeles and Oxnard), the risks to the 
population ( x ~ )  argued for siting the terminal in a remote area (Point 
Conception). Finally, concerns about earthquake risk brought about 
opposition to the Los Angeles site, which was found to be crossed by a sig- 
nif icant fault. 
The interaction phase of round A (see Table 3) indicates the attri- 
butes used as arguments by each of the major involved parties. It is 
important to distinguish this listing of attributes from that in Table 1. 
Whle Table 1 specifies which attributes are of prhnary concern to each 
party, Table 3 specifies which attributes were used as arguments by each 
party. Thus while the applicant is concerned with both profit considera- 
tions and supply interruption risk, its arguments in support of each site 
stressed supply interruption risk. 
Two key decisions were made during Round A. First, the CCC, con- 
cerned about the catastrophic potential of LNG, implied that they were 
likely to favor Point Conception over the non-remote sites due to 
Table 3: Elements of  Round A 
Problem Formulation: Should t h e  proposed s i t e s  be approved? 
That is  : Does C a l i f o r n i a  need LNG, and i f  s o ,  which, 
i f  any, of  t h e  proposed s i t e s  i s  appropr i a t e?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant  f i l e s  f o r  approval  of t h r e e  s i t e s .  
A l t e rna t ives :  S i t e  a t  Po in t  Conception: A1 
S i t e  a t  Oxnard: A2 
S i t e  a t  Lost Angeles: A 
S i t e  a t  any combination o f :  A' ,  A ~ ,  
I n t e r a c t i o n  : 
Involved P a r t i e s  
Applicant  P 1 
*FERC p 2 
"ccc p 3 
" c i t y  Councils P 6 
S i e r r a  Club P 7 
Local C i t i z e n s  p 8 
A t t r i b u t e s  Used a s  Arguments 
X l  
x1 x 3 
Key Decisions: 
1. CCC concerns over  popula t ion  r i s k  imp l i e s  t h a t  A' i s  p r e f e r r e d  
over  t h e  o t h e r  two sites. 
2 .  FERC would no t  approve A~ because t h e  se i smic  r i s k  i s  g r e a t e r  
than  a p re sc r ibed  accep tab le  l e v e l .  
Conclusion : 
Applicant  pe rce ives  a s ta lemate ,  i .e.,  t h a t  no s i t e  is  approvable 
without  long delay.  
" ~ n t e r e s t e d  p a r t y  wi th  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e c i s i o n ( s ) .  
concerns over population risk. Specifically, the CCC advised western to 
pursue a t  least one site in a remote area since they would deny approval 
to any non-remote site which was not considered safe. Second, the FERC 
indicated disapproval of the Port of Los Angeles as an acceptable site 
because a recently discovered earthquake fault increased the seismic 
risk above a prescribed acceptable level. 
The round was concluded with a possible stalemate, a t  least as per- 
ceived by industry (Ahern 1980). Los Angeles would not receive federal 
(FERc) approval, Oxnard might not receive state (CCC) approval, and 
Point Conception would face difficult approval challenges a t  the county 
and state (CCC) levels because of its adverse land-use impacts. 
The stalemate of Round A formulated the problem for Round B. It 
was clear to all the parties involved that  it was difficult, if not impossible, 
for the applicant to gain approval for a site under the existing siting pro- 
cedure in California. In particular, there were possibilities of vetoing pro- 
posals a t  either the federal, s tate,  or local levels as evidenced by the 
respective reactions to the three proposed sites. Rather than trying to 
operate within the existing constraints of the process, the interested par- 
ties in the process frequently t ry  to change the rules of the game (Majone 
1979). 
This behavior relates to the process described by Braybrooke (1978) 
where he points out that  issues are frequently transformed over time. 
Round B is a good illustration of this process. The problem was redefined 
into two new questions: How should need for LNG be determined? If need 
is established, how should an  LNG facility be sited? The round was thus 
initiated when pressure to change the siting procedure was brought to 
the state legislature by the utility compariies, the business community 
and the labor unions in California. Table 4 depicts the relevant alterna- 
tives which formed the basis for the debate on the elements of proposed 
legislation. 
The industry and business interests saw the inevitable problem of 
obtaining local approval for a project in the national interest, but with 
costs to the local community. So the utility companies battled for a bill 
(S.B. 1 OBI) which would vest the CPUC with one-stop licensing authority, 
precluding any interference from local communities. The environmental 
and local interests, on the other hand, objected to a one-stop licensing 
process and favored a bill which required remote-siting. 
The resulting legislation was a compromise between the environmen- 
talists, who supported consideration of off-shore sites, and those who saw 
an urgent need for an LNG facility to assure energy and jobs. The CPUC 
was chosen over the more conservation-minded CCC or the California 
Energy Commission as the agency with state permit authority, preempt- 
ing local governments. As a bow to the conservationists, the CCC was 
given the mandate to choose and to rank possible sites, and to pass these 
rankings on to the CPUC. I t  was agreed that the site would not be off- 
shore, as some environmentalists wished, nor could it be in a populated 
area, as the gas utilities wished. Indeed, a nonpopulated area was strictly 
defined. There could be no more than an average of 10 people per square 
mile within one mile of the terminal, and no more than 80 people per 
square mile within four miles of the terminal. 
Table 4:  Elements of Round B 
Problem Formulation: How should need f o r  LNG be determined? 
IF need i s  es tabl ished,  how should an I l JG f a c i l i t y  
be s i t e d?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant and others  pu t  pressure on s t a t e  l eg i s l a t u r e  
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  LNG s i t i n g .  
Alternatives:  Consider offshore s i t e s :  B ' 
Consider remote onshore s i t e s  : B 
Consider non-remote onshore s i t e s :  B 
One-stop l icensing:  B 
Licensing Agency: CPUC = B 5 ,  CCC = B 6 ,  CEC = B7" 
Any consis tent  combination of B' through B7. 
In te rac t ion  : 
Involved P a r t i e s  At t r ibutes  Used f o r  Arguments 
Applicant p1 x1 
CCC p3 x2 x5 
CPUC p 4 x 1 
"*state Legis la ture  P5 XI: X 2  
Key Decisions: 
3. I n i t i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  introduced which included B l r  .B2,  and B'. 
4. Final  l e g i s l a t i o n  passed which incorporated ~~r B 4 #  and B5. 
Conclusion: 
Passage of LNG S i t i n g  Act of 1977 . (S.B. 1081 ) which def ines  a 
custom-tailored s i t i n g  procedure fo r  LNG. Some features :  
-- CCC nominates and ranks s i t e s  i n  addi t ion t o  t h e  one applied 
f o r  
-- B U C  s e l e c t s  a site from t h e  CCC-ranked setr  not necessar i ly  
t he  top-ranked s i t e .  
"CEC = Cali fornia  Energy Commission 
" " ~ n t e r e s t e d  par ty  with respons ib i l i ty  f o r  decision (s) . 
The passage of the Siting Act of 1977 (S.B.1001) opened up a new pro- 
cedure for finding an acceptable site and led to Round C with the follow- 
ing problem formulation: Whch site should be approved? The round was 
initiated by the CCC which, after considering 02 sites meeting the 
remote-siting constraint, ranked the top four sites, Camp Pendleton, 
Rattlesnake Canyon, Point Conception, and Deer Canyon, in that  order, on 
the basis of seismic, soil, wind and wave conditions, rough cost, and coa- 
stal resource considerations. 6 
These four alternatives form the background for the interaction 
among the interested parties in Round C as shown in Table 5. The CCC 
passed these rankings on to the CPUC whch chose, by process of elimina- 
tion, Point Conception, on the grounds that the two higher-ranked sites 
would involve unacceptable delay and would cause unacceptable risk to 
transients (i.e., campers, swimmers, etc.) at the nearby beaches and pub- 
lic parks. The CPUC, however, could only conditionally approve Point Con- 
ception subject to the utility company's ability to show that earthquake 
faults discovered in the area presented an acceptable risk to the termi- 
nal. 
At the federal level, the FERC staff determined that the risks of both 
Oxnard and Point Conception were acceptably low, so that Oxnard should 
be preferred on land-use grounds; however, the FERC, choosing to avoid a 
federal-state confrontation, ruled in favor of Point Conception. After an 
appeal by the environmental and local interests, the Washington, D.C. 
Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the FERC on the grounds 
'point Conception was included in the candidate set because S. 1081 required that the 
applied-for site be included. 
Table 5: Elements of Round C 
Problem Formulation: Which s i t e  should be approved? 
In i t i a t ing  Event: Applicant f i l e s  for  approval of Point Conception s i t e .  
(The only s i t e  of the original three meeting' the 
remote s i t i n g  constraint of S.B.1081.) 
Alternatives : (Si tes  nominated by CCC plus applied-for s i t e )  
S i t e  a t  Camp Pendleton : C' 
Si te  a t  Rattlesnake Canyon: c2 
S i t e  a t  Point Conception: c 
S i t e  a t  Deer Canyon: c 
Interaction: 
Involved Part ies  
Applicant P 1 
*FERC PP 
CCC p 3 
" B U C  p 4 
Sierra  Club P 7 
Local Citizens P 8 
Attributes Used for  Arguments 
Key Decisions : 
5. The CCC has the following preference: C' > .c2 > c3 > c4 
6. The CPUC approved conditional on whether or  not the seismic 
r i sk  is acceptable. 
7. The FERC consider c3 acceptable. 
8. Court requires FERC t o  consider additional data t o  determine 
whether or  not seismic r isk a t  c3 is acceptable. 
Conclusion : 
FERC and CPUC t o  consider additional seismic data. 
- - - 
"~n te res t ed  party with responsibili ty for  decision (s) . 
that not all available seismic risk data were considered by the FERC in its 
ruling. This decision concluded Round C. 
Round D is still in progress a t  this time. As shown in Table 6 the ini- 
tiating proposal is determined by the activities in Round C which frame 
the alternatives as simply whether or not to declare the Point Conception 
site seismically safe. Only two parties, the FERC and the CPUC are 
currently active in the process, and they are considering only one 
attribute--the seismic risk at  Point Conception. A final decision will 
depend upon whether the new studies show t h s  risk to be above or below 
some acceptable level. 
V. INTWPRETATION OF THE MAMP MODEL 
The MAMP representation is designed to both describe a political 
decision process, and to bring structure to that description that might 
suggest institutional reforms. The California decision process illustrated 
in this paper can be interpreted from many varied perspectives. It is a 
good example of conflicting national and local interests; it is a study of 
the workings of the adversarial nature of U.S. regulatory proceedings; it 
is a precedent-setting report of procedural practice for setting energy 
policy; as well as an  account of introducing a controversial large-scale 
technology with a small probability of a catastrophic accident. Clearly, a 
full exposition of these interpretations would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. In this spirit we will briefly present two insights from this 
approach which are of particular interest to  the IIASA Risk Group: the 
importance of sequential decision making and the role that risk analysis 
Table 6: Elements of  Round D 
Problem Formulation: Is P o i n t  Conception s e i s m i c a l l y  s a f e ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: FERC and B U C  s e t  up procedures  t o  cons ider  a d d i t i o n a l  
s e i smic  r i s k  data.  
A l t e rna t ives :  Declare Po in t  Conception s a f e :  D 
Declare Po in t  Conception n o t  s a f e :  D2 
I n t e r a c t i o n :  
No i n t e r a c t i o n  y e t ,  a s  s tudy groups f o r  FERC and CPUC examine 
se i smic  d a t a  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  hear ings .  
Curren t ly  Active P a r t i e s  A t t r i b u t e  Considered 
FERC p2 x 3  
*CPuc p4 x 3  
Key Decisions : 
Noneyet. Future  hea r ings  a r e  t o  determine whether o r  n o t  
se i smic  r i s k  is acceptable  f o r  P o i n t  Conception. 
" In t e re s t ed  p a r t y  w i t h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  dec is ion( . s ) .  
has played in the siting process. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING 
The sequential aspect of the LNG siting process in California is cru- 
cial for understanding the current situation. During the seven year 
course of the process, the need for imported natural gas in California 
diminished greatly. Instead of examining this need, the interested par- 
ties, "locked in" by previous decisions, are now examining the seismic 
data at a rather slow pace. This is an example of a process of non- 
decision making where the interested parties are using existing political 
institutions and procedures to limit the scope of actions. There may be 
no incentive for anyone to rule on the seismicity of Point Conception i f  
there is now little interest in siting an LNG terminal. 7 
A second example of undesirable effects from sequential constraints 
concerns the risk of an interruption in the supply of natural gas. Initially, 
the applicant stressed supply interruption risk due to shortage of natural 
gas as a major reason for importing LNG to three separate sites. During 
the course of the decision process, for reasons beyond the control of the 
applicant, the three sites were reduced to one site, and the number of 
storage tanks at  that site were reduced from four to two. The planned 
Point Conception throughput of 58,000mS LNG/day, (equivalent in energy 
flow to roughly 15 modern nuclear reactor units), is large for one geo- 
graphical location (Mandl and Lathrop 1981). Because of this 
 o or a more detailed discussion of the role of non-decision making in the political process 
see Bachrach and Baratz (1970). 
concentration in one small area, and the possibility of routine closures or 
nondelivery resulting from bad weather e tc . ,  the net result of the sequen- 
tial decision process is that a project originally meant to decrease  supply 
interruption risk has been shaped over time into a project that may 
increase supply interruption risk. 
The sequential nature of the decision procedures, as clearly demon- 
strated by the increasing concreteness of the problem formulations 
through the four rounds of discussions in California, limits the possibili- 
ties for comprehensive analyses. The risk studies were carried out, not 
as an  input to  a broad energy siting analysis in California, but to  support 
a more narrowly defined problem (Should site x or site y be approved?). 
Since Round A in California was n o t  defined in these narrow terms (the 
question of whether the terminal was needed was yet t o  be resolved), the 
analyses were ill suited to  address fully the issues on the  table. In some 
sense, then, analyses designed t o  address the question of safety were 
prematurely introduced into a process that had not resolved higher-order 
questions of energy policy. Though they served to focus the debate on 
the  safety question, they could not offer (nor were they intended t o  offer) 
a panacea for the resolution of the siting question. 8 
'1t is not surprising, then, that Round A ended in a stalemate. The second round, where the 
State Legislature took center stage, narrowed the problem (by resolving the question wheth- 
er California needed a site) to one more receptive to technical risk studies. 
THE ROLE OF RISK ANALYSES 
A great deal of attention has also been paid recently to the topic of 
technological risk assessment for problems such as the siting of facilities 
(see Conrad 1980 and Schwing and Albers 1980). It is of interest to exam- 
ine the role that risk assessments have played in the California LNG case. 
During the course of the LNG debate in California, six studies assess- 
ing the safety risks of the proposed terminals were conducted by the util- 
ity and local, state and federal government agencies (for a critical review 
of these studies, see Mandl and Lathrop 1981). Several studies are of par- 
ticular interest. The applicant commissioned a consulting firm, Science 
Applications Inc. (SAT), to do a study and the FERC produced its own risk 
assessment. Both reports showed very low numbers on various proba- 
bilistic measures of risk (expected fatalities per year and individual pro- 
bability of fatality per year). These numbers were interpreted to mean 
that  the risk was acceptable. A risk assessment produced by the consult- 
ing firm Socio-Economic Systems (SES) for the Oxnard municipal govern- 
ment suggested similarly low probabilistic measures of risk (though 
expected fatalities were 380 times higher than the applicant's assess- 
ment), but they interpreted the figures as unacceptably high. 
One explanation lies in the format for presenting the results. The SAI 
study described maximum credible accidents (MCAs) without accompany- 
ing probabilities. Opposition groups interpreted these results as evidence 
that the terminal was not acceptably safe. The municipal government ori- 
ginally in favor of the site, began to waver in its support, probably influ- 
enced by the apparent uncertainty of the risk and the strength of the 
opposition groups (Ahern 1980). In sum, risk assessments did not provide 
a single, coherent assessment of acceptability of the risk of an LNG termi- 
nal; their results were subject to interpretation depending on party posi- 
tions (Lathrop 1980). In fact, risk assessments were used both to pro- 
mote and to oppose terminal applications. 
In reviewing the technical differences among the assessments lead- 
ing to these conclusions, Lathrop and Linnerooth (in press) have shown 
that there are many degrees of freedom left to engineering and analytic 
judgment, including how to characterize risk, what formats to use for 
presentation, what gaps to fill with assumptions, which of several conflict- 
ing models to use, how to portray the degree of confidence in the results, 
and what contingencies simply to leave out of the analysis. 
This analytic freedom helps explain the differences among the above 
three Oxnard risk assessments. I t  can push the risk measurement in any 
direction. Very conservative assumptions can drive it up; omissions of 
inconvenient aspects such as terrorism can drive it down. Clear presen- 
tations of expert disagreements can decrease the confidence in the 
results; and so on. The final result may have as much to do with the 
predilections of the analyst as with the physical characteristics of the site 
or technology. 
This finding takes on special significance when viewed in the context 
of the policy process. The MAMP model has illustrated that the risk 
assessments, though intended to advise a client on the safety of the pro- 
posed terminal, were, almost without exception, eventually used to sup- 
port a party argument. For t h s  reason, clear incentives exist for the 
analysts to present their results as persuasively as possible, which 
explains the tendency on their part to omit discussions on the uncer- 
tainty of their results and to choose presentation formats that present 
their case as strongly as possible. 
YI. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The California case study illustrates that political decisions are 
messy when there are  grave uncertainties regarding the risks and bene- 
fits of proposed projects. Interested parties hesitate to express their 
opinions too clearly because of a fear that they can be used against them. 
The arguments they actually use are designed to persuade but may not 
represent their true objectives. Over time the parties may change their 
positions, either because they have reconsidered the problem in the light 
of new information or because an exogenous event occurs which creates a 
short-run crisis. These points have been alluded to in the recent litera- 
ture on information processing as well as in the emerging literature on 
technology and risk assessment from an institutional perspective. 9 
The MAMP model should be viewed as a starting point for undertaking 
research which can improve the political process with respect to prob- 
lems such as the siting of facilities. We have seen that formal risk ana- 
lyses, especially risk assessments, are subjective exercises undertaken to 
support a specific party's arguments. Furthermore, the importance of 
these analyses will depend on the nature of the sequential decision pro- 
cess, the relevant interested parties which interact and the type of con- 
'A set of papers on this subject appears in Conrad (1960) and Kunreuther and Ley (in press). 
tlicts produced between them. Given these descriptive observations the 
following research areas appear to be promising avenues for the future. 
ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY OF ANALYSES 
In a recent paper Nelkin and Pollak (1979) indicate the inadequacy of 
existing institutions to deal with problems of conflicting evidence and 
polarized expert opinion with respect to questions such as risk assess- 
ments. As a way of dealing with this problem, they advocate the need to 
establish rules of evidence as a basis for making better decisions. 
Lathrop and Linnerooth (in press) provide a suggested set of guidelines 
with respect to establishing rules of evidence. In particular, they stress 
the importance of defining the risk being assessed, being clear on 
assumptions and error bounds as well as indicating the conditional nature 
of specific analyses which are undertaken. 
There is a need for more field research which attempts to apply 
these criteria or others to  a specific set of problems. One of the difficul- 
ties which currently exists is the lack of an institutional mechanism for 
evaluating the different risk assessments produced by different parties. 
Ackerman e t  al. (1974) point out that the traditional approaches such as 
legal responses, agency hearings and judicial reviews have inherent limi- 
tations with respect to evaluating these conflicting assessments. The 
problem is especially difficult for the siting of new technologies where 
there are no objective measures of risk. Private consulting firms fre- 
quently undertake these analyses and have a built in bias in telling the 
contracting party what they want to hear. 
We feel that the policy recommendation suggested by Ackerman et 
al., that one establish a review board to examine these assessments, 
deserves a trial for problems such as the LEG siting case discussed above. 
Under the proposed procedure the members, all of whom would be 
trained in subjects fundamental to technical analysis, would provide a 
written report evaluating the impact of specific assessments and specific 
issues (e.g., population risk, environmental impact). The authors urge 
that particular attention be given to specifying the empirical basis of the 
set of findings and how well the analysis is grounded in scientific theory. 
In a very stimulating paper, Buckley, Burns and Meeker (1974) point 
out that existing institutional mechanisms and social relations among the 
interested parties significantly influence their response to a particular 
problem or issue. The MAMP model is an attempt to explore the type of 
interactions between the parties. The emphasis is thus on the decision 
process rather than simply on the outcomes, as in standard models of 
choice such as game theory, multi-attribute utility theory and cost- 
benefit analysis. 
Buckley, Burns and Meeker point out that one can help resolve con- 
flicts and promote collective decision making by better structuring the 
environment in which decisions are made. For example, communication 
between the parties who disagree with each other on particular alterna- 
tives can be facilitated by having some type of mediator (e.g., a govern- 
ment agency) who hears opposing arguments as well as enforcing 
agreements made in an earlier round. 
Future empirical research could examine the types of attributes one 
would like a decision process to satisfy. For example, one could ask "have 
each of the interested parties been satisfied with its role in the process?" 
"Were a wide enough set of alternative considered so that the parties felt 
that a choice was actually being made?" The answers to these types of 
questions in a concrete problem context may also suggest specific policy 
recommendations. For example, if all interested parties were expected 
to have access to the same type of information (e.g., risk assessments 
evaluated by a review board) before evaluating different alternatives then 
some type of institutional mechanism would be needed to achieve this 
objective. 
In investigating process there should be a recognition that certain 
factors may be more important in some cultural settings and less 
relevant in others. The promising work of Thompson (1981) and Douglas 
and Wildavsky (in press) on developing elements of a cultural theory of 
risk suggests that the constellation of different groups (e.g., castes, 
sects) and the type of interaction between them are important considera- 
tions in spe clfying approaches for promoting collective decision-making. 
Nelkin and Pollak (1979) point out that appropriate procedures vary with 
national political styles. They note that the approach to solving conflicts 
in a political context of consensus and compromise will differ from that in 
an adversary culture. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
If interested parties have conflicting goals and objectives it may be 
possible to design certain policy instruments to reallocate the costs and 
benefits so that there is more harmony between the groups. Two 
mechanisms that may be particularly relevant in t h s  connection are 
insurance schemes and compensation systems. 
Insurance may provide a way of protecting potential victims against 
potential property losses and physical injury. Today there is limited 
insurance protection against large-scale accidents such as a catastrophic 
accident of an LNG terminal. A US General Accounting Office report 
(1978) concluded that under present liability arrangements injured par- 
ties could not be fully compensated for a serious accident. Some of the 
research questions which could be appropriately addressed in future 
problem-focused studies are: 
Which of the interested parties is liable in the event that  a 
specific disaster occurs after a project has been sited? 
What types of enforcement procedures can be evoked to assure 
that contract provisions are satisfied ezpos t?  
Are there historical lessons which shed light on the role of 
insurance as a tool for providing financial protection to potential 
victims? 
With respect to the more direct consequences of a siting a new facil- 
ity O'Hare (1977), has proposed a compensation system to deal with oppo- 
sition to proposed sites from certain interested parties. For example, 
suppose residents of a community were concerned with suffering losses in 
property values as well as safety and environmental risks if the project 
was sited there. O'Hare proposes that each community determines a 
minimum level of per capita compensation for it to be willing to make a 
legal commitment to have the project in its backyard if the compensation 
is paid. 
Further research is needed on the problems of such a system work- 
ing in practice for a particular problem. In California, no facility was 
approved in part because compensation was not offered to the affected 
public who perceived themselves as losers. Buckley, Burns, and Meeker 
(1974) have suggested that changing the structure of payoffs may reduce 
conflicts of interest between the parties. On the other hand, it is not 
clear what type of payments would be necessary to appease opposition 
groups such as the Sierra Club. 
From the above suggested topics it should be clear that there is con- 
siderable research on risk which needs to be undertaken of a prescriptive 
nature. The purpose of our cross-country comparisons of LEG siting deci- 
sions is to provide considerable data on how the political process appears 
to work in practice and the differences across countries. The MAMP 
model described in this paper has been found to be a useful framework 
for making comparisons between countries. The challenge for the future 
is to capitalize on our understanding of process to try and improve politi- 
cal decision making. 
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